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Editorial
Dear Reasoners,
teaching is (nearly) over
and so are marking and
all sorts of board meet-
ings. A few trips to con-
ferences and workshops and
then the well deserved sum-
mer break! This would all
sound pretty standard, except
many of us interpret summer
breaks as the perfect time to
do some real work or at least
some good reading. While
The Reasoner cannot help
you finishing up the book
draft, the community of rea-
soners can certainly help you packing your luggage with good
books. So here is a call for contributions to The Reasoning
Summer Reading List. Please send your list of up to 5 titles
along with a one-line description to features@thereasoner.org.




Preferences, Utility, and Rationality:
Game Theory in the Lab
Here is a very basic question: can we meaningfully talk about
the rationality of a subject involved in an experiment and, if we
can, how could we achieve this? To answer this question, first
of all we have to be sure that we agree on how two words are
used in economics, namely “utility” and “rationality”.
Thus, what is the meaning in economics of attaching a cer-
tain utility to something?
To answer this question we address it in the most basic set-
ting conceivable, namely by assuming, without loss of gener-
ality, that there is no risk or uncertainty involved in the de-
cision. The idea is that this something, e.g., an apple, be-
longs to given set of alternatives (finite, again just to simplify
the exposition and without loss of generality), that we call
F = {apple, orange, strawberry}, on which a decision maker
(henceforth, DM) has some preferences, where these prefer-
ences are captured by a relation  on F, that we call strict pref-
erence. For example, we assume for a DM under our scrutiny
that apple  orange  strawberry: this means that this DM
prefers an apple to an orange or a strawberry, and an orange to
a strawberry. In this very simplistic case, in order to be able to
meaningfully talk about the utility that the DM attaches to an
apple, the relation  has to satisfy two properties called asym-
metry (i.e., for elements x, y of F, if x  y, then it is not the case
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more complex structure than the Dictator Game, what could
we say concerning our original question?
Bottom line: if we want to be able to sensibly state that a
DM is rational, shouldn’t we always divide an experiment from
which we want to eventually draw conclusions on the rational-
ity of the subjects in two stages? In stage 1 subjects’ prefer-
ences should be elicited (in an incentive-compatible way) via
their choices on all the possible subsets of the possible out-
comes of the game that they have to play in stage 2, and only
in stage 2 their actual choices in the game should be recorded
and evaluated (along with their rationality... with the caveat
that maybe it could not be possible to evaluate it, since stage
1 could show that some subjects’ preferences simply cannot be
represented via a utility function).
Piefrancesco Guarino
Maastricht University
A type of simulation which some experimental ev-
idence suggests we don’t live in
Do we live in a computer simulation? I will present an argu-
ment that the results of a certain experiment constitute empiri-
cal evidence that we do not live in, at least, one type of simula-
tion. The type of simulation ruled out is very specific. Perhaps
that is the price one must pay to make any kind of Popperian
progress.
In electronics, a soft error is a type of error caused by a par-
ticle hitting a computer’s memory banks. Early computer chips
were manufactured with materials that emitted alpha particles
due to radioactive decay. These alpha particles could hit mem-
ory cells and change memory values. The same phenomenon
can happen if a cosmic ray hits the computer.
Suppose we live in a computer simulation with the following
x-x̂ property: for each memory-bit x in any computer in our
world, there is a memory-bit x̂ in the simulating computer such
that x̂ is used to store which value is stored in x. Then any such
x is subject to two different types of soft errors:
◦ (Internal) Soft errors caused by simulated particles hitting
x in our simulated universe.
◦ (External) Soft errors caused by real particles hitting x̂ in
the universe where the simulation takes place.
Further, assume the following uni-directional property: putting
a simulated memory-bit inside a simulated vault does not pro-
tect it from external soft errors. We mean “vault” literally: a
non-metaphorical barrier of hard matter in the simulated uni-
verse.
Putting a simulated memory-bit in a simulated vault might
protect it from internal soft errors, because a thick vault might
physically block incoming particles. The uni-directional prop-
erty says this defense cannot prevent external soft errors. If
we live in an external-soft-error-prone simulation with the x-x̂
property and the uni-directional property, no vault we build can
perfectly protect a memory-bank from all soft errors, because
each memory-bit x in that memory-bank remains susceptible to
external soft errors caused by real particles hitting x̂.
A paper by O’Gorman et al (1996: Field testing
for cosmic ray soft errors in semiconductor memories,
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5389436/, IBM Journal of
Research and Development 40 (1), 41–50) describes (p. 46) the
following experiment and its results. A total of 864 modules
were first run on the second floor of a two-story building for
4,671 hours, during which time, 24 soft errors were detected.
Then, the same 864 modules were run for 5,863 hours in a
nearby vault shielded by about 20m of rock, during which time,
zero soft errors were detected.
The above results suggest that a vault of 20m of rock blocked
all soft errors. By the above remarks, this is experimental evi-
dence that we do not live in an external-soft-error-prone simu-
lation with the x-x̂ property and the uni-directional property. If
we do live in such a simulation, then it should not be possible
to protect a simulated memory-bank with a simulated vault.
Of course, this is not a mathematical proof, merely empir-
ical evidence. The evidence could be improved, or the thesis
falsified, with further experiments. What if we repeat the ex-
periment and soft errors are detected in the vault? Without ad-
ditional technology, we are unable to tell which soft errors were
simulated and which were real. (We can only distinguish them
vacuously: if zero soft errors occur, then zero are simulated and
zero are real.) If soft errors persist in settings more and more
hostile to internal-soft-errors, that is evidence that either we’re
overlooking (and failing to control for) some unknown source
of internal soft errors, or else that external soft errors exist. The
latter would entail we live in a external-soft-error-prone simula-
tion, albeit not necessarily one with the x-x̂ and uni-directional
properties (maybe x-x̂ fails for other memory-bits besides the
ones tested; maybe soft errors in the simulating computer af-
fect non-memory components of the simulated computers, in-
directly manifesting as soft errors in simulated computers; and
so on).
Perhaps this paper’s most interesting conclusion is just that a
non-contrived simulation hypothesis is falsifiable in a concrete
way. One can easily imagine many types of simulations we
could live in that are not external-soft-error-prone, or that lack
the x-x̂ property, or that lack the uni-directional property. I hope




Explanation and Understanding, Ghent, 23–25
May 2018
The workshop Explanation and Understanding was held on
May 23rd to 25th at the Royal Academy of Dutch Language
and Literature in Ghent, Belgium. It was the seventh in the
Logic, Reasoning and Rationality series of workshops sup-
ported by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) through
the scientific research network on Logical and Methodologi-
cal Analysis of Scientific Reasoning Processes. The network
brings together research groups from nine European universi-
ties carrying out research on relevant topics: Adam Mickiewicz
University Poznań, Free University of Brussels, Ghent Uni-
versity, Ruhr-University Bochum, Tilburg University, Univer-
sity College London, University of Antwerp, Utrecht Univer-
sity and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. For the duration of the
project, from 2016 till 2020, there are two workshops organized
per year, one in spring and one in autumn.
The seventh workshop was organized by the Centre for Logic
and Philosophy of Science of Ghent University, which coordi-
nates the activities of the network, and the Department of Phi-
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losophy of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
The theme of the workshop, explanation and understanding,
is one that is attracting a lot of attention in current philoso-
phy of science. While most philosophers agree that science
aims for explanation, and that one of the aims of explanation
is to provide understanding, the unresolved question is how to
account for this link between explanation and understanding.
Most earlier accounts of explanation either took understand-
ing to be of little philosophical interest—as merely a psycho-
logical phenomenon without epistemic import—or they consid-
ered the notion redundant—arguing that everything philosoph-
ically interesting could be captured with explanatory concepts,
making ideas on understanding superfluous. Either way, for a
long time the philosophy of science by and large ignored un-
derstanding, focusing on explanation instead. Things are very
different now: the last two decades have witnessed a flourish-
ing philosophical literature on the relation between explanation
and understanding. And perspectives diverge greatly: while
some argue that current ideas about understanding offer noth-
ing distinctively new and relevant over and above explanatory
concepts, others stress the distinctive role of understanding vis-
á-vis explanation, and yet others make the case that one can
have understanding without explanation.
Most of this recent literature appears to focus on full-fledged
theories and explanations, neglecting other aspects of the ex-
planatory enterprise. For instance, how does the idea of under-
standing play out in the context of explorative phases preced-
ing scientific discovery, or in the early phases of discovery?
What is the epistemic role of understanding in the usage of
how-possibly models or hypothetical models to explain aspects
of real systems? How does understanding relate to abstraction
and idealization practices?
The workshop brought together 21 participants who pre-
sented talks on a great variety of topics related to the main
theme. A number of talks discussed general issues, such as
the relation between explanation and understanding, ontic ver-
sus epistemic conceptions of explanation, and the possibility of
understanding without explanation. Other issues that were dis-
cussed included specific types of explanations (e.g., minimal
structure explanations, narrative explanations) and the under-
standing they provide and the issue of whether, and if so how,
various types of models—such as how-possibly models and
machine learning models—can provide understanding. Finally,
a number of talks discussed how understanding is achieved in
different scientific disciplines and fields, such as evolutionary
biology, population genetics, quantum mechanics, medical sci-
ence, mathematics, history, ecology, and criminal law.
The keynotes (summarised below) were delivered by Mat-
teo Colombo (Tilburg), Caterina Marchionni (Helsinki) and
Alexander Reutlinger (Munich).
The backdrop of Matteo Colombo?s keynote, “I know that
I know nothing. Explanation, Prejudice, and Intellectual Hu-
mility??, is the robust phenomenon that people are prejudiced
towards members of groups with a worldview they perceive to
be dissimilar from their own. In his talk, Matteo brought to-
gether ideas and methods from existing literatures on expla-
nation and intellectual humility, and discussed how people’s
intellectually humble explanatory reasoning might impact the
relationship between dissimilarity and prejudice.
In her keynote, “Explanatory norms as frictions to integra-
tion: the case of economics and its neighbours??, Caterina
Marchionni looked at the relationship between economics and
neighbouring fields, and examined ways in which field-specific
norms about explanation hinder the integration of mechanis-
tic models across fields. She argued that the mechanism-based
unity of science championed by Craver and other mechanistic
philosophers is better captured by the image of a (dis-unified)
cubist painting than that of a (unified) mosaic.
In the keynote, “Understanding and Non-Causal Explana-
tion??, Alexander Reutlinger, argued that there is a unified ac-
count of causal and non-causal explanations, viz., the counter-
factual theory of explanation, and he elaborated how this theory
of explanation could provide a fruitful building block for a uni-








Formalization of Arguments: special issue of Dialectica,
deadline 31 July.
Reliability: special issue of Synthese, deadline 11 November.
Instrumentalism about Epistemic Rationality: For and
Against: special issue of Synthese, deadline 30 October.
What’s Hot in . . .
Medieval Reasoning
Anyone passingly familiar
with Ancient or Medieval
Philosophy has probably no-
ticed that those thinkers had
a fondness for making cat-
egorisations and distinctions
– along with the same cut-
throat polemical attitude and
penchant for splitting hairs
that most philosophers still
have today. The traditional
debates about the classifica-
tions and divisions of logic
are numerous, extensive and (in)famous enough to ring a bell
even with non-specialists: is logic a tool or a part of philoso-
phy?; is it a scientific discipline (scientia) or a practical tech-
nique (ars)?; is it primarily about language (scientia sermoci-
nalis) or about reason (scientia rationalis)?; what is its subject?
The list could go on and on. It is easy to guess that the answers
to these questions are often not clear-cut and tend to intermin-
gle. But, overall, the consensus is that traditional logic is wider
than contemporary logic and includes several ontological, lin-
guistic, epistemic and even psychological issues that many of
us wouldn’t even consider to be logic in the first place. In a
sense, a lot of traditional logic deals with meta-logical ques-
tions, with problems pertaining to the philosophy of logic, and
with what we would define as ”reasoning”. As far as the ”rea-
soning” aspect is concerned, it would be incorrect to believe
that it was exhaustive of the traditional logical practices and
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